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ABSTRACT
In recent years, the question of how to prevent another crippling re-
cession has become a prominent one. The answer provided by the
Dodd-Frank Act is stress testing, which examines through economic
models how banks would react to a bad turn of economic events, such
as negative interest rates. The first of its kind in the legal literature, this
Article offers a model for stress testing that banks should use in com-
plying with Dodd-Frank. Specifically, this Article finds that the Baye-
sian model that takes into account past outcomes, namely the Federal
Reserve's previous stress test scenarios, is the most accurate model in
stress testing.
I. INTRODUCTION
As even Hollywood has taken to explaining these days', the credit
crisis was a driver of the Great Recession. 2 In other words, banks had
made risky loans and were low on capital when the loans defaulted. It
became dire enough that bank credit cards and ATMs would have
eventually stopped working. In fact, Secretary of the Treasury Henry
Paulson estimated that in the last recession, the ATMs were three
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1. See, e.g., The Big Short (2015) (starring Christian Bale and Brad Pitt).
2. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Dam, International Law and the Financial Crisis: The Subprime Crisis
and Financial Regulation: International and Comparative Perspectives, 10 CHI. J. INT'L L. 581,
581-84 (2010) (describing several causes of the 2008 financial crisis and the resulting impact on
the economy).
323
324 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAw JOURNAL [Vol. 14:323
days away from not working. Although the level of risk in the finan-
cial sector had been significant,3 the regulators and the firms were all
using the same risk models that did not measure it accurately, sug-
gesting that the firms were not being sufficiently scrutinized.
The question on everyone's mind since these events has been how
to prevent another banking institution failure.4 The Federal Reserve
("Fed") has decided to implement the solution of stress testing, under
the authority of the Dodd-Frank Act. The purpose of stress testing is
to ensure that a bank has adequate capital to survive a financial crisis
by not tying up its money in bad loans or risky investments.5
The idea of stress testing is not new.6 In fact, stress testing is at least
as old as fire drills, the classic stress test. The fire alarm rings, forcing
people to leave their warm offices and stand outside in the cold, wait-
ing for the drill to finish. It may be irritating to participants, but
serves an important purpose: to ensure that everyone is ready in case
there is ever a fire. Can management get people out of the building
fast enough? Are the exits clearly marked? Do people know what to
do?
Similarly, bank stress testing simulates bad economic conditions in
economic models to ensure that a bank has enough money to survive
another financial crisis. What if unemployment rises to 10%? What if
3. But see Wulf A. Kaala & Richard W. Painter, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard:
Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in Germany and the United States, 40 SE-
TON HALL L. REV. 1433 (2010) ("[T]he concepts of 'whether there is any such thing as excessive
risk, and if so, how excessive risk is to be defined, is another issue. Viewpoints on these ques-
tions will have a substantial impact on how a policy maker-or a group of policy makers in a
particular country-approaches regulation of risk in the banking sector.').
4. See, e.g., Alan J. Meese, Essay, Section 2 Enforcement and the Great Recession: Why Less
(Enforcement) Might Mean More (GDP), 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1633 (2012); Michael Green-
berger, Closing Wall Street's Commodity and Swaps Betting Parlors: Legal Remedies to Combat
Needlessly Gambling Up the Price of Crude Oil Beyond What Market Fundamentals Dictate, 81
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 707 (2013); Cody Vitello, The Wall Street Reform Act of 2010 and What It
Means for Joe & Jane Consumer, 23 Lov. CONSUMER L. REV. 99 (2010).
5. James E. Kelly, Transparency and Bank Supervision, 73 ALB. L. REV. 421, 421 (noting that
following the 2008 financial crisis, attention has focused on the role of systemic risk in financial
institutions and markets). "The stress tests allow the Fed to tailor its regulatory efforts based on
realistic information, and enable financial institutions to simulate how they might fare under
highly adverse economic conditions." Derek E. Bambauer, Schr?dinger's Cybersecurity, 48 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 791, 836-37 (2015).
6. "Although stress analysis is a parvenu in the bank regulatory regime, it has a
long history in the engineering field from as early as the sixteenth century. These early
stress testing methodologies evolved into professional norms on the part of engineers
to remain focused on worst-case scenarios when designing and building structures,
materials, and systems. Financial firms have adopted an extensive suite of stress testing
techniques alongside their risk management systems."
Robert Weber, A Theory for Deliberation-Oriented Stress Testing Regulation, 98 MiNN. L. REV.
2236, 2324-2325 (2014).
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the stock market craters? Would the bank have enough money not
tied up in loans or bad investments?7 Stress testing uses hypothetical
future scenarios set by the Federal Reserve to inform ex ante regula-
tion. For the 2016 stress tests, for example, banks had to consider
their preparedness for negative U.S. short-term Treasury rates, as well
as major losses to their corporate and commercial real estate lending
portfolios.8
Although stress testing is not new, what is new is the Federal Re-
serve's role in setting bad case scenarios and requiring banks to use
them in their stress tests, the results of which must be reported annu-
ally. 9 The Dodd-Frank Act facilitated stress testing by empowering
agencies to prevent another crisis. Thus, the Federal Reserve Bank
imposes stress testing on banks that have over $10 billion in assets, in
order to ensure the stability of the American financial sector. The $10
billion threshold implicates many banks in the United States, includ-
ing BMO Harris, Key Bank, and smaller regional banks, in addition to
the well-known big banks such as Bank of America and Goldman
Sachs.
When a bank fails its stress test, it is headline news. A failed stress
test raises red flags about whether a bank has enough capital to stay
solvent in a crisis. Without enough capital, the bank would stop pay-
ing dividends, which would impact, for example, retirement portfolios
with bank stock.
There have been a few banks who have failed their stress tests re-
cently. Citigroup failed twice, and Goldman Sachs and Bank of
7. "Stress tests help financial institutions, as well as their regulators and other
stakeholders, understand how an institution or system will respond to severe, yet plau-
sible, stressed market conditions such as low economic output, high unemployment,
stock market crashes, liquidity shortages, high default rates, and failures of large
counterparties. The results of stress tests shed light on the tension points and weak links
in portfolios and institutions that could create extraordinary, but plausible, losses."
Robert F. Weber, The Corporate Finance Case for Deliberation-Oriented Stress Testing Regula-
tion, 39 J. CORP. L. 833, 833-34 (2014).
8. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2016 Supervisory Scenarios for Annual
Stress Tests Required under the Dodd-Frank Act Stress Testing Rules and the Capital Plan Rule
(January 28, 2016), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg
20160128a2.pdf.
9. Making public the results of bank stress tests is just another form of transparency.
"In the recent crisis transparency concerns have generally been focused on two groups:
(i) financial institutions and markets, where disclosure, efficiency, fairness, and detec-
tion of systemic risk are emphasized as benefits of greater transparency, and (ii) the
federal government, particularly the Department of Treasury, the Federal Reserve, and
the banking supervisors, as stewards and regulators, where fairness, accountability and
taxpayer protection tend to be emphasized."
James E. Kelly, Transparency and Bank Supervision, 73 ALB. L. REV. 421, 424-25 (2010). See
also TIMOTHY GEITHNER, STRESS TEST: REFLECTIONS ON FINANCIAL CRISES (2014).
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America would have failed if they had not amended their capital dis-
tributions, which changed the results. However, there are no guiding
models for stress testing. This Article contributes by filling this void.
In their stress tests, banks have to measure two major types of risk:
market risk and credit risk. Market risk is the risk that the banks will
lose money on trading stocks and bonds, while credit risk is the risk
that their customers will default on their loans. There is an additional
risk in these stress test models, and that is the risk that the model does
not accurately reflect all possible outcomes. This could lead to a failed
stress test.
Any sort of model requires justification of why certain variables are
in the model and what values are used for the variables. Otherwise,
the model does not accurately reflect reality, which is called "model
risk." Model risk is managed by model validation, which is the effec-
tive and independent challenge of each model's conceptual soundness
and control environment.
Also, some models look only at the data, as opposed to historical
experience or the judgment of experts who may bring experiences that
do not exist in the data. For example, models might be missing input
from loan officers, even when this input is helpful - a loan officer
issuing mortgages for 30 years might have a lot of good qualitative
perspective. A Bayesian methodology allows incorporation of these
views by representing them as Bayesian priors.
This Article shows that the Bayesian model that takes into account
past outcomes, namely the Federal Reserve's previous stress test sce-
narios, requires a more significant buffer for uncertainty - by 25% -
as opposed to simply modeling each year's scenario in isolation. This
means that if modelers do not take previous results into account, they
can underestimate losses significantly - by as much as 25%. This
could be the difference between a successful stress test and a failed
stress test. Part II of this Article begins by laying out the legal frame-
work. Part III suggests models for banks to use in stress testing.
This Article uses the previous Federal Reserve scenarios as priors.
This is because of the belief in the industry that the Federal Reserve
adapts its scenarios to stress certain portfolios, but remains consistent
with its prior scenarios in terms of economic intuition. This Article
uses two sources of data: the hypothetical economic scenarios released
by the Federal Reserve annually and the consolidated financial state-
ments of banks, which detail credit losses by type of loan.
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II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR STRESS TESTING
The legal framework on stress testing has exploded in the last dec-
ade, significantly since being required by the Dodd-Frank Act, which
was the Congressional reaction to the Great Recession.' 0 Stress test-
ing has now become the primary way to regulate banks, despite sev-
eral issues it raises, considered in this Part.
A. Introduction of Stress Testing
Since the Great Depression, there have been several types of regu-
lation of banks: geographic restrictions, activity restrictions, capital or
equity requirements, disclosure mandates, and risk management over-
sight." "These regimes have been employed successively and in tan-
dem to combat new problems and to make use of technological
innovation in modernizing regulatory tools."12
Stress testing is another category of regulation, which examines the
performance of the regulated entity in hypothetical, challenging cir-
cumstances. Immediately after the beginning of the Great Recession,
in February 2009, several regulators that included Treasury, the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Office of Thrift Supervision
revealed the details of Treasury's Capital Assistance Plan (CAP),
which required stress testing (Supervisory Capital Assessment Pro-
gram (SCAP)) of, primarily, the 19 largest U.S. banking enterprises.' 3
In other words, to receive government assistance in the wake of the
financial crisis, banks had to subject themselves to stress testing.14
The results showed that several of these banks would need more capi-
10. "[O]n July 21, 2010, President Obama signed into law a package of financial reg-
ulatory reforms unparalleled in scope and depth since the New Deal: The Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Act or Dodd-Frank Act) was a
sweeping reaction to perceived regulatory failings revealed by the most severe financial
crisis since the Great Depression. The Dodd-Frank Act was intended to restructure the
regulatory framework for the United States financial system, with broad and deep im-
plications for the financial services industry where the crisis started."
Heath P. Tarbert, The Dodd-Frank Act-Two Years Later, 66 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 373,
373 (2012).
11. Mehrsa Baradaran, Regulation by Hypothetical, 67 VAND. L. REv. 1247 (2014).
12. Id. at 1247.
13. MICHAEL P. MALLOY, BANKING LAw & REG. s 14.04 (2015).
14. "Prior to the crisis, surprisingly few financial institutions put themselves through stress
testing exercises. In the depths of the crisis, however, regulators conducted stress tests on the
largest U.S. banks with what seems to have been great success both for the health of the institu-
tions and the marketplace." Eugene A. Ludwig, Assessment of Dodd-Frank Financial Regula-
tory Reform: Strengths, Challenges, and Opportunities for a Stronger Regulatory System, 29 YALE
J. ON REG. 181, 188 (2012).
327
328 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAw JOURNAL [Vol. 14:323
tal to withstand worse-than-expected economic conditions.15 How-
ever, the banks eventually recovered. 16
The regulators' continued interest in stress testing was then rein-
forced by the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act §165(i), legislation
which required periodic stress tests conducted by the Federal Reserve
on the regulated banks and by the banks themselves. The stated aim
of the Dodd-Frank Act is "to promote the financial stability of the
United States by improving accountability and transparency in the fi-
nancial system, to end 'too big to fail', to protect the American tax-
payer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial
services practices, and for other purposes."' 7
To prevent financial instability in the United States, the Dodd-
Frank Act generally sought to enhance the supervision of non-bank
financial companies supervised by the Board of Governors and certain
bank holding companies.' 8 To advance this goal, the Act requires
stress testing of financial institutions of a certain size because the big-
gest banks pose the most significant harm to the American economy.19
The result was 31 bank holding companies participating in stress test-
15. "Through the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program [SCAP], the Treasury
required each of the nineteen largest U.S. banks, representing some two-thirds of all
U.S. bank assets, to simultaneously undertake a Treasury-specified assessment of the
bank's capital two years into the future under two different scenarios-one baseline
and one more adverse-in order to identify whether the bank had sufficient capital
under each. The methodology of the Stress Test was publicly disclosed so that its credi-
bility could be independently evaluated. Banks that reported a capital shortfall would
be required to raise new capital in that amount, which the Treasury would provide if
the market would not. Importantly, the Treasury publicly announced the results of the
Stress Test, and the corresponding determination of capital adequacy. The Stress Test
revealed that ten of the banks had inadequate capital, while nine had sufficient capital.
Of the banks that had to raise new capital, the size of the shortfall ranged from $0.6
billion to $33.9 billion."
Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Market Efficiency After the Financial Crisis: It's Still A
Matter of Information Costs, 100 VA. L. RaV. 313, 358 (2014).
16. "In a speech reflecting on the SCAP one year after its conclusion, Chairman
Bernanke pointed to several factors as evidence of its success: the majority of the
nineteen firms that needed capital following the stress tests were able to raise the capi-
tal in the market (as opposed to receiving assistance from Treasury); most of the
nineteen firms had repaid TARP money that they had received during the crisis; share
prices of the nineteen firms had generally increased; and banks' access to debt markets
and interbank and short-term funding markets had improved."
Ludwig, supra note 14, at 188.
17. Pub.L. 111-203, Title I, § 165.
18. 12 U.S.C. § 5365(i) (2010). Pub.L. 111-203, Title I, § 165(i).
19. Additionally, "Congress demonstrated sensitivity to the regulatory burden on smaller in-
stitutions in the passage of Dodd-Frank." Heidi Mandanis Schoone, Regulating Angels, 50 GA.
L. REv. 143, 156 (2015).
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ing in 2015, which represented more than 80 percent of domestic
banking assets.20
The Dodd-Frank Act authorized the Federal Reserve and other
agencies to implement regulations to prevent another financial crisis. 21
The Federal Reserve included stress testing in its January 2012 pro-
posed rules that would implement enhanced prudential standards re-
quired under Dodd-Frank Act §165, including stress testing,22 as well
as the early remediation requirements established under Dodd-Frank
Act §166.23 In October 2012, the Federal Reserve issued a final rule
requiring financial companies with total consolidated assets of more
than $10 billion to conduct annual stress tests, effective November 15,
2012.24 The biggest banks, those with over $50 billion in assets, must
conduct semi-annual stress tests.25
Stress testing under the Dodd-Frank Act is based on hypotheticals
set by the Federal Reserve Bank.26 Specifically, financial system mod-
20. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Dodd-Frank Act Stress Test 2015:
Supervisory Stress Test, Methodology and Results (Mar. 2015).
21. See, e.g., Greg Bader, Stress Tests: Making Sure the Large Banks Can Weather Another
Storm, 18 WESTLAW JOURNAL BANK & LENDER LIABILITY 1 (2013) (providing an overview of
stress testing and potential reasons why Congress included it as part of the Dodd-Frank Act).
"But the Dodd-Frank Act is an empty vessel: it authorizes agencies to regulate without giving
them much guidance as to how to regulate." Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, An FDA for
Financial Innovation: Applying the Insurable Interest Doctrine to Twenty-First-Century Financial
Markets, 107 Nw. U. L. REV. 1307, 1309 (2013). There has been significant criticism of the
Dodd-Frank Act. See, e.g., Steven A. Ramirez, Dodd-Frank as Maginot Line, 15 CHAP. L. REV.
109, 119, 130 (2011) (suggesting that the Dodd-Frank Act will not necessarily prevent a future
financial crisis).
22. "The Dodd-Frank stress test implemented Dodd-Frank sections 165(i)(1) and
(i)(2), which required both supervisory and company-run stress testing over a wider set
of institutions than those covered by the CCAR. Institutions subject to the Dodd-
Frank stress test include those bank holding companies with assets of $50 billion or
more that had participated in SCAP (and who had also participated the previous year
in CCAR), as well as bank holding companies with between $10 billion and $50 billion
in assets, and state member banks and savings and loan holding companies with over
$10 billion in assets."
Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 15, at 358-361.
23. Other government agencies that have proposed or issued rules on stress testing include
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency.
MALLOY, supra note 13, at s 14.04.
24. Id.
25. Dodd-Frank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5365(i) (2010). "Note that there is a redundancy in the
stress testing; one should keep in mind, however, that in conducting its stress tests, the Federal
Reserve has an eye toward macroprudential responsibilities, whereas the bank largely focuses on
microprudential issues." Ludwig, supra note 14, at 186 n.20. See also Daniel K. Tarullo, Keynote
Address, Macroprudential Regulation, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 505 (2014); Claude Lopez, Donald
Markwardt, & Keith Savard, Macroprudential Policy: What Does It Really Mean, 34 No. 10
BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL'Y REP. 1 (2015).
26. "The genesis of the current supervisory stress tests and CCAR dates back to
early 2009, when supervisors conducted simultaneous stress tests of the 19 largest U.S.
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eling allows the introduction of variables that approximate various ad-
verse economic developments, allowing an assessment of results if the
system were under stress. 2 7 The Board of Governors must provide at
least three different sets of conditions under which the evaluation
shall be conducted, including baseline, adverse, and severely ad-
verse.28 In other words, the economy imagined by the hypotheticals is
in differing levels of strain, allowing the banks to test their readiness
for a range of different economies. The Federal Reserve must publish
a summary of the results of these tests.29
The Federal Reserve has other discretionary powers under the
Dodd-Frank Act as well. It may require additional tests, may develop
other analytic techniques to identify risks to the financial stability of
the United States, and may require institutions to update their resolu-
tion plans as appropriate based on the results of the analyses. 30
In 2010, the Federal Reserve had also initiated the annual Compre-
hensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) exercise, which in-
volves quantitative stress tests and a qualitative assessment of the
largest bank holding companies' capital planning practices, which re-
quires the bank to submit its detailed capital plans.31 CCAR is sepa-
rate from the Dodd-Frank stress tests, impacting only the largest
banks-those with over $50 billion in assets.32 CCAR has become a
BHCs (the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program or SCAP) in the midst of the
financial crisis. The SCAP stress test assessed potential losses and capital shortfalls at
the 19 large BHCs under a uniform scenario that was, by design, even more severe than
the expected outcome at that time."
Tim P. Clark & Lisa H. Ryu, CCAR and Stress Testing as Complementary Supervisory Tools,
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (updated June 24, 2015), available at http://
www.federalreserve.gov/ bankinforeg/ccar-and-stress-testing-as-complementary-supervisory-
tools.htm#f5.




31. "In late 2011, following the Stress Tests, the Federal Reserve Board finalized a
rule requiring U.S. bank holding companies with consolidated assets of $50 billion or
more to submit annual capital plans for review in a program known as the Comprehen-
sive Capital Analysis and Review ('CCAR'). The stress testing under CCAR is con-
ducted annually. Each bank holding company's capital plan must include detailed
descriptions of: 'the [holding company's] processes for assessing capital adequacy; the
policies governing capital actions such as common stock issuance, dividends, and share
repurchases; and all planned capital actions over a nine-quarter reporting horizon.' In
addition, each holding company must report to the Federal Reserve the results of vari-
ous stress tests that assess the sources and uses of capital under both baseline and
stressed economic conditions."
Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 15, at 359-360.
32. "While DFAST [Dodd-Frank Act stress testing] is complementary to CCAR [Comprehen-
sive Capital Analysis and Review], both efforts are distinct testing exercises that rely on similar
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main component of the Federal Reserve System's supervisory pro-
gram for the largest banks.
A bank holding company must conduct its stress test for purposes of
CCAR using the following five scenarios: 1) supervisory baseline: a
baseline scenario provided by the Federal Reserve Board under the
Dodd-Frank Act stress test rules; 2) supervisory adverse: an adverse
scenario provided by the Board under the Dodd-Frank Act stress test
rules; 3) supervisory severely adverse: a severely adverse scenario pro-
vided by the Board under the Dodd-Frank Act stress test rules; 4)
bank holding company (BHC) baseline: a BHC-defined baseline sce-
nario; and 5) BHC stress: at least one BHC-defined stress scenario.33
If banks fail to meet the Federal Reserve's set capital levels, regula-
tors can restrict their ability to pay dividends to shareholders so that
the bank can accumulate additional capital. This is a decision ordina-
rily reserved for the banks' managers, illustrating the power of the
regulator's role.3 4
Customers of banks have felt the consequences of this regulatory
environment. Most notably, many banks have restricted their lending
practices.35 Indeed, the entire aim of these regulations is to diminish
credit risk, part of which is ensuring that only credit-worthy people
processes, data, supervisory exercises, and requirements. The Federal Reserve coordinates these
processes to reduce duplicative requirements and to minimize regulatory burden." Stress Tests
and Capital Planning, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (June 25, 2014), avail-
able at http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/stress-tests-capital-planning.htm.
"The main difference between the CCAR and the Dodd-Frank stress tests is the capital
action assumptions that are combined with pre-tax net income projections to estimate
post-stress capital levels. The Dodd-Frank test uses a standard set of capital action
assumptions that are laid out in the Dodd-Frank test rules, while the CCAR analysis
uses the bank holding company's planned capital actions to determine whether the
company would meet supervisory expectations for capital minimums in stressful eco-
nomic conditions."
Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 15, at 361.
33. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Comprehensive Capital Analysis and
Review 2015: Summary Instructions and Guidance (updated October 31, 2014), available at http:/
/www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/stress-tests/CCAR/2015-comprehensive-capital-analysis-
review-summary-instructions-guidance-stress-test-conducted.htm.
34. "Historically, bank regulators have restricted bank dividends as part of a larger effort to
preserve banks' capital and make them more able to withstand losses." Robert F. Weber, The
Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review and the New Contingency of Bank Dividends, 46
SETON HALL L. REV. 43, 43 (2015).
35. Karen Gordon Mills & Brady McCarthy, The State of Small Business Lending: Credit Ac-
cess During the Recovery and How Technology May Change the Game, 34-35 fig.24 (Harvard
Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 15-004, 2014), available at http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publica-
tion%20Files/15-004_09b1bf8b-eb2a-4e63-9c4e-0374f770856f.pdf [http://perma.cc/ES9U-
MWWP]; Kelly Mathews, Comment, Crowdfunding, Everyone's Doing It: Why and How North
Carolina Should Too, 94 N.C. L. REV. 276, 284-85 (2015).
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are able to borrow. However, there have been several issues arise
relating to stress testing.
B. Issues Regarding Stress Testing
The health of the financial sector has been left to stress testing,
which has become the primary way to regulate banks. Some commen-
tators want stress testing expanded to other firms. 36 However, there
have been several issues emerge relating to stress testing since its rise
as a major indicator of a financial institution's health.
First, the various capital adequacy and liquidity ratio scenarios
that were used in the initial round of stress tests were criticized as
being too lenient and thus able to produce a false positive. Second,
the macroeconomic indicator assumptions about the scenarios that
these entities may face were also criticized as too optimistic, further
exacerbating the problem of test validity. Third, choosing which in-
stitutions need to be tested is a tacit admission of their importance
to the macroeconomic health of the country, and, as such, enshrines
their status as 'too big to fail.'3 7
Another commentator has criticized regulation by hypothetical re-
gime, namely by stress tests and living wills, 3 8 suggesting it must be
either abandoned or strengthened because of its current flaws. 39 For
example, there might be tension in the Federal Reserve Board's deter-
mination of the amount of stringency for the stress tests. On the one
hand, the Federal Reserve Board is tasked with systemic risk regula-
tion, but, on the other hand, the functioning of the markets is also a
key concern. 40 Methodological issues include claims that the tests are
36. Kwon-Yong Jin, Note, How to Eat an Elephant: Corporate Group Structure of Systemically
Important Financial Institutions, Orderly Liquidation Authority, and Single Point of Entry Reso-
lution, 124 YALE L.J. 1746, 1785-1786 (2015) (suggesting expanding stress tests to the subsidiary
level of financial institutions).
37. Behzad Gohari & Karen Woody, The New Global Financial Regulatory Order: Can
Macroprudential Regulation Prevent Another Global Financial Disaster?, 40 J. CORP. L. 403, 432-
33 (2015).
38. "The Dodd-Frank Act's "living will" requirement mandates that systemically im-
portant financial institutions develop wide-ranging strategic analyses of their business
affairs, and submit comprehensive contingency plans for reorganization or resolution of
their operations to regulators. The goal is to mitigate risks to the financial stability of
the United States and encourage last-resort planning, which will allow for a rapid and
efficient response in the event of an emergency."
Nizan Geslevich Packin, The Case Against the Dodd-Frank Act's Living Wills: Contingency Plan-
ning Following the Financial Crisis, 9 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 29, 29 (2012).
39. Baradaran, supra note 11, at 1247; see also Jonathan C. Lipson, Against Regulatory Dis-
placement: An Institutional Analysis of Financial Crises, 17 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 673, 724 (2015)
("While stress tests and living wills are laudable, they seem unlikely to overcome the uncertainty
and complexity of Dodd-Frank's resolution regime, and the incentive effects it will have on po-
tential pre-failure negotiations.").
40. Baradaran, supra note 11, at 1251.
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not adverse enough and are too narrowly focused both on a single
static point in time and single data point.41 There have been some
concerns caused by the consistently positive results delivered by stress
tests. "When the government conducts what it claims to be a rigorous
stress test of a bank and then gives that bank a clean bill of health, the
market receives a signal not only that the bank's risks are well man-
aged but also that the government itself will stand behind the bank if
the assessment proves incorrect." 42 Commentators have also won-
dered whether the exercise of stress testing will be made moot by per-
manent stress testing that would continue to produce overly positive
results.43
Criticism has also targeted the enforcement of any regulation. For
example, there is the possibility of bias in enforcement of the laws. 4 4
Furthermore, there are separate critiques regarding over-regulation of
the business environment. 45
Finally, there has been some question about how much related to
stress testing should be made public. Currently, the stress test models
used by the Federal Reserve are not made public, as some commenta-
tors have wanted. However, the results of stress tests are made public,
but that in itself is controversial too. Some have argued that people
will avoid using banks that perform poorly in stress tests, preventing
such banks from recovering from an unsatisfactory stress test.46
In 2015, the Federal Reserve started to make changes after issues
were discovered internally with the model validation process, which
seeks to ensure the quality of the economic models themselves. In
2014, the model validation function had conducted three reviews as-
sessing its performance and that of the broader supervisory stress test-
ing program. The model validation function noted several areas for
improvement. First, its staffing methods were inconsistent with indus-
try practice and depended on a select number of key personnel. Sec-
41. Id. at 1247.
42. Id.
43. Gohari & Woody, supra note 37, at 433.
44. Joan Macleod Heminway, Save Martha Stewart? Observations About Equal Justice in U.S.
Insider Trading Regulation, 12 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 247, 263 (2003).
45. See, e.g., Karen Woody, Conflict Minerals Legislation: The SEC's New Role as Diplomatic
and Humanitarian Watchdog, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1315 (2012) (noting that Dodd-Frank even
extends to regulating conflict minerals for ethical reasons). For the argument that tax incentives
might be better solutions to certain corporate issues than regulation, see Margaret Ryznar &
Karen Woody, A Framework on Mandating versus Incentivizing Corporate Social Responsibility,
98 MARQ. L. REV. 1667 (2015).
46. See generally Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 15, at 313; Henry T. C. Hu, Disclosure Uni-
verses and Modes of Information: Banks, Innovation, and Divergent Regulatory Quests, 31 YALE
J. ON REG. 565 (2014).
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ond, there were risks identified that were related to changes to models
that occur late in the supervisory stress testing cycle. Third, model
inventory lacked several components either required or deemed use-
ful by supervisory guidelines. Finally, limitations encountered by re-
viewers during model validation were not sufficiently identified for
management in the validation reports submitted to management.47
In response, the Federal Reserve has devoted a full-time team to
the validation process. Additionally, the Federal Reserve has estab-
lished a committee of senior staff to oversee the model validation for
the stress testing models.48 Thus, the Federal Reserve has recommit-
ted to stress testing as the means of regulation of banks, with several
advantages. To the extent that stress testing improves the security of
banks in the United States, it is useful. Also, to the extent that bank
stress testing increases the use of American banks and confidence in
the American markets, it is beneficial. 49 Nonetheless, there is room
for improvement on the models that banks use. As one such improve-
ment, this Article suggests the Bayesian model for stress testing.
III. PROPOSED MODEL
Given the importance of stress testing,50 there remains room for im-
provement. While the Federal Reserve stress testing methods have
not been publicly disclosed, the banks have been more transparent in
their stress testing. They have not used the Bayesian model in their
stress tests, even though there are significant advantages to it.
47. Office of Inspector General, The Board Identified Areas of Improvement for Its Supervi-
sory Stress Testing Model Validation Activities, and Opportunities Exist for Further Enhancement
(October 29, 2015), available at https://oig.federalreserve.gov/reports/board-supervisory-stress-
testing-model-validation-oct20l5.htm.
48. Ryan Tracy, Fed Finds Fault With Its Own Stress Tests, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Dec. 6,
2015), available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/fed-finds-fault-with-its-own-stress-tests-
1449311404.
49. "Accordingly, the SCAP strongly suggests that stress tests, if done properly, are able to
build important market confidence and stability." Ludwig, supra note 14, at 188. There can be a
similar argument made to Professor Coffee's that "[securities] [i]ssuers migrate to U.S. ex-
changes because by voluntarily subjecting themselves to the United States's higher disclosure
standards and greater threat of enforcement (both by public and private enforcers), they par-
tially compensate for weak protection of minority investors under their own jurisdictions' laws
and thereby achieve a higher market valuation." John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top?:
The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock Market Competition on International Corporate Govern-
ance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1757 (2002).
50. "The way stress tests are conducted is critical. For example, it appears that the European
stress tests have not been effective or helpful supervisory tools. In fact, one commentator has
even gone so far as to call them 'farcical,' as the Irish banking system collapsed just four months
after the country's banks passed their stress tests. Ludwig, supra note 14, at 188.
2016] IMPLEMENTING DODD-FRANK AcT STRESs TESTING
A. Bayesian Modeling - A Theoretical Approach
When implementing a model, the specification of a model, defini-
tion of parameters, quantities of interest, or specification of the pa-
rameter space all require justification that is an important part of the
model validation procedure expected of financial institutions.51 If the
model is not appropriate for the purpose for which it has been put to
use, model risk arises. 52 However, estimation of parameters, such as
variable inputs, after these judgments are made typically proceeds
without regard for potential non-data information about the parame-
ters, in an attempt to appear completely objective.
Nonetheless, subject matter experts typically have information
about parameter values, as well as about model specification. For ex-
ample, a loan loss rate should lie between zero (0%) and one (100%),
or a dollar loss estimate for an institution should be no more than the
value of assets on an institution's books, or the definition of the pa-
rameter estimated. However, if we are considering a loss rate for a
particular portfolio segment, we in fact have a better idea of the loca-
tion of the rate.
The Bayesian approach allows formal incorporation of this informa-
tion, i.e., formal combination of the data and non-data information
using the rules of probability. In the context of stress testing, we may
take an institution's or the regulators' base scenarios or their adverse
scenarios to represent such non-data information as our Bayesian
prior. Note that often when building a stress testing model, the devel-
oper would be given this information exogenously with respect to the
reference data at hand.
The Bayesian approach is most powerful and useful when used to
combine data as well as non-data information while incorporating
powerful computational techniques such as Markov Chain Monte
Carlo methods. Such models are widely discussed in the economics
and finance literature and have been applied in the loss estimation
settings. These applications invariably specify a "prior," which is con-
venient and adds minimal information - there is no such thing as an
uninformative prior - allowing computationally efficient data analysis.
However, this approach, while valuable, misses the true power of the
Bayesian approach, i.e., the coherent incorporation of expert
information.
51. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, Supervisory Guidance on Model Risk Management (OCC 2011-12; FED-BOG SR 11-
7), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov lbankinforeg/srletters/srl107al.pdf.
52. See supra Part I.
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The difficulty in Bayesian analysis is the representation of expert
information in the form of a probability distribution, which requires
thought and effort, rather than mere computational power; therefore,
it is not commonly followed. Furthermore, in "large" samples, data
driven information will typically overwhelm non-dogmatic prior infor-
mation, so the prior is irrelevant asymptotically, and economists often
justify ignoring prior information on this basis.
However, there are many settings in which expert information is
extremely valuable, such as when data is scarce, costly, or when its
reliability is questionable. These cases can include model performance
in unlikely but plausible scenarios (e.g., Lehman Brothers) or the con-
struction of models on a low default portfolio. In the context of stress
testing, it is the case that scenarios may be hypothetical and not sup-
ported by observed historical data. Such issues more frequently arise
in loss estimation, where sufficient data may not be available for cer-
tain assets or for new financial instruments, or where structural eco-
nomic changes, such as the growth of a new derivatives market, may
raise doubts about the relevance of historical data.
Empirical analysis in our paper follows the steps in a Bayesian anal-
ysis of a stress testing model. Estimation of stressed losses rates for
groups of homogeneous assets is essential for determining the amount
of adequate capital under stressed scenarios. Since our goal is to in-
corporate non-data information in our Bayesian analysis, we utilize
the supervisory stress testing scenarios to elicit and represent expert
information which is used to make inferences in the context of a sim-
ple model of loss. In this regard, we are aware that many institutions
are moving away from simple linear regression frameworks for CCAR
or Dodd-Frank Act Stress Tests, toward models such as proportional
hazards or rating migrations; nevertheless, regression-based tech-
niques at an aggregated level are still rather prevalent in the industry,
so that we think that there is value in using this as a starting point, and
we can consider more advanced techniques for future directions of
this research.53
The dynamic linear models (DLMs) can be regarded as a general-
ization of the standard linear regression model, where the regression
coefficients are allowed to either change over time, or to be stochastic
as in the formulation herein 54. The Linear Regression Model (LRM)
53. Another reason why banks are moving toward these more advanced approaches is that
loss at horizon can very well affect loss in later periods and, in turn, capital actions.
54. For a detailed exposition of the Bayesian approach, see generally JOHN GEWEKE, CONTEM-
PORARY BAYESIAN ECONOMETRICS AND STATISTICS (2005); see also CHRISTIAN P. ROBERT, THE
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is the most popular tool for relating the variable Y, to a vector of
explanatory variables X. It is defined as:
y = X ,p +6st =1,.,n ( )
i~i~d 
.
where -, ~ N (0, a 2 ) is a standard Gaussian disturbance term, Y, is
a random variable, and both Xt and P are p-dimensional vectors. In its
basic formulation, the variables X, are considered as deterministic or
exogenous; while in stochastic regression, Xt are random variables. In
the latter case we have in fact, for each t, a random (p+l) dimensional
vector (Yt,X,)', and we have to specify its joint distribution and derive
the LRM from it. A way for doing this (but more general approaches
are possible) is to assume that the joint distribution is Gaussian:
X, X, [ , ET[Y[ x y X 
(2)
From the properties of the multivariate Gaussian distribution, we
can decompose the joint distribution into a marginal model for Xt and
a conditional model for Y, given X= x, as follows:
X,1,4 N(p,,1,) (3)
Y Ix,, Z-~N p( x,, Y (4)
where P, l +=A Xt (5)
2  -1 (6)
P2 X XY
'g, Y x
If the prior distribution on (p, Y) is such that the parameters of the
marginal model and those of the conditional model are independent,
then we have a partition in the distribution of (Yt,Xt,p,1); that is, if our
interest is mainly on the variable Y,, we can restrict our attention to
the conditional LRM, which in this case describes the conditional dis-
tribution of the latter given (P,Y) and X,. Therefore, we may rewrite
model (3)-(8) as follows:
Y Ix,P, V~-N(xP, V) (9)
BAYESIAN CHOICE: FROM DECISION-THEORETIC FOUNDATIONS TO COMPUTATIONAL IMPLE-
MENTATION (2001).
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implies a diagonal covariance matrix v o0 2  2 2.
O 0 U2
Therefore, Bayesian inference in this LRM is conditionally inde-
pendent, with the same variance 02. More generally, V can be any
symmetric positive-definite matrix.
We describe the Bayesian inference with conjugate priors for the
regression model for the case of inference on 0 and V. If both 1 and V
are random, analytical computations may become complicated; a
tractable case is when V has the form V = G2D, where 02 is a random
variable and the n x n matrix D is known; e.g., D = I,,. Let 0 = 0-2 be
the precision parameter. Then a conjugate prior for (P,0) is a Normal-
Gamma distribution, with parameters ( 0 ,No',a,b):
K (P, #)_ 2 ,>4exp [-bo]exp -_ 2(0 -1P po)T N ' ( -Po)] (10)
that is: P 1~( N po,(VNo)') (11)
0 - G(a,b) (12)
Here conditionally on o, P has covariance matrix (0N 0) 1 2 
where we let C0 = N ', a symmetric pxp positive-definite matrix that
"rescales" the observation variance c2. This is the version of the
Bayesian regression model that we implement in this study.
B. Bayesian Modeling - An Empirical Implementation
Our empirical analysis for the implementation of Bayesian method-
ology to stress testing and model validation follows the CCAR pro-
gram closely. As part of the Federal Reserve's CCAR exercise, U.S.
domiciled top-tier Bank Holding Companies (BHC) are required to
submit comprehensive capital plans, including pro forma capital anal-
yses, based on at least one BHC defined adverse scenario which is to
be defined by quarterly trajectories for key macroeconomic variables
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over the next nine quarters or longer, to estimate loss allowances.55
The BHC scenarios are meant to test idiosyncratic risks per bank (e.g.,
a cybersecurity attack for a bank with a heavy retail presence). In
addition, the Federal Reserve generates its own supervisory stress sce-
narios, so that firms are expected to apply both BHC and supervisory
stress scenarios to all exposures, in order to estimate potential losses
under stressed operating conditions. Separately, firms with significant
trading activity are asked to estimate a one-time potential trading-re-
lated market and counterparty credit loss shock under their own BHC
scenarios, and a market risk stress scenario provided by the supervi-
sors. In the case of the supervisory stress scenarios, the Federal Re-
serve provides firms with global market shock components that are
one-time hypothetical shocks to a large set of risk factors.56
Table 1 lists the macroeconomic variables used in supervisory stress
testing scenarios as part of the Federal Reserve CCAR Program. Our
analysis of using the macroeconomic stress scenarios to inform histori-
cal analysis is based on the collection of the last three Federal Reserve
scenarios for the three macroeconomic variables over these nine quar-
ter periods, i.e., Real Gross Domestic Product (year-to-year change),
Unemployment Rate, and HPI - National Housing Price Index. We
justify focusing on these three variables as they are the most com-
monly used for forecasting loan losses (especially as unemployment
and GDP growth are perceived to be proxies for economic health),
and the most accepted by regulators, as well as having good explana-
tory power for the target loss variables that we are considering in this
study. We consider the two CCAR supervisory stress scenarios in
2011 and 2012, and the supervisory severely adverse scenario in 2013,
focusing on aggregate bank gross charge-offs (ABCO) from the Fed
Y9 report as a measure of loss. Our historical dataset covers the pe-
riod from 2000 to 2013.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study of its kind which
combines data to form the prior three supervisory exercises in stress
testing within the Bayesian framework. The reason why we base the
prior distributions upon the supervisory scenarios is a practical one, as
often modelers will use the quality of the supervisory scenarios as a
criterion in model development, for example, a common practice be-
ing testing the redeveloped model with the prior years' scenarios. Of
55. See supra Part II.
56. In addition, large custodian banks are asked to estimate a potential default of their largest
counterparty. For the last two CCAR exercises, these shocks involved large and sudden changes
in asset prices, rates, and Credit Default Swap spreads that mirrored the severe market condi-
tions in the second half of 2008.
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course, model developers have the option to use their own internally
developed scenarios, or information gleaned from subject matter ex-
perts such as the lines of business, in order to form their priors.
Table 2 presents the summary statistics of and correlation between
the macroeconomic variables for both our historical dataset and the
Federal Reserve scenario we use in our empirical analysis. Figure 1
displays the time series and kernel density plots of these variables for
both datasets. ABCO, a measure of bank losses, averages 70 basis
points over the-last 14 years since 2000, peaking at 2.72% toward the
end of 2009. ABCO is extremely skewed toward periods of mild loss
during early 2000s, having a mode of around 20-25 basis points. Year-
on-Year Change in Real Gross Domestic Product (RGDPYY) histori-
cally averages 1.94%, while in the Federal Reserve stress scenarios it
displays an average contraction of -0.73%, having mild positive and
negative skews in historical and Federal Reserve scenario data,
respectively.
Figure 1 shows that while the historical distribution of annual Real
GDP changes is bimodal, having modes at around 5% and 9%, which
represents the historical regime shift between expansionary and con-
tractionary economic periods, annual real GDP changes in the Federal
Reserve scenario distribution has a single mode at around zero. Un-
employment has an historical average of 6.4% (ranging from 4% to
10%), while in the Federal Reserve scenarios it is centered at 11.9%
(ranging from 10% to 14%). As with GDP, Unemployment displays a
bimodal distribution, with modes of 4% and 9% (10% and 14%) con-
sidering the historical data (data from Federal Reserve scenarios).
The historical average of HPI has an historical average of 150.2 (rang-
ing from 101.6 to 199.0), while in the Federal Reserve scenarios it is
centered at 129.0 (ranging from 112.8 to 142.4). As with the other
macroeconomic variables, HPI displays a bimodal (unimodal) distri-
bution, with modes of 140 and 180 (135) considering the historical
data from Federal Reserve scenarios.
We estimate univariate, bivariate, and trivariate Bayesian as well as
Frequentist models for each of the three macroeconomic variables by
forming priors using univariate regressions. In our empirical imple-
mentation, our data sample is the history, which includes historical
economic statistics, and the prior sample is formed from the
macroeconomic statistics of the last three pooled Federal Reserve sce-
narios. Dependent variables for prior regressions are established by
calculating the historical quantile of each macroeconomic variable
based upon the scenario dataset, and using the historical value of
ABCO at that quantile as the response variable.
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Our empirical results for all regressions are presented in Table 3
and Figure 2. In order to conserve space, we only display the density
plots and posterior distributions of trivariate Bayesian regressions for
aggregate bank gross charge-offs versus each variable, identifying cor-
responding macro-sensitivity.
The results for estimating the posterior distributions on macro-sen-
sitivities in univariate regression are presented in Panel A of Table 3.
The historical data (Federal Reserve scenarios) estimate of the coeffi-
cient for real GDP changes is -0.2267 (-0.3953), resulting in a posterior
estimate of -0.2500, which is slightly higher in absolute value. In the
case of Unemployment, coefficient estimates are 0.3735, 0.4263, and
0.4 for historical, Federal Reserve scenario, and posterior, respec-
tively. For HPI, historical data estimate of the coefficient is -0.0044
while for the Federal Reserve scenarios it is -0.0271, which translates
into a posterior estimate of -0.0150 that is much higher in absolute
value. Therefore, in general the posterior estimates are greater in ab-
solute value, reflecting greater sensitivity as observed in the scenario
dataset that informs the prior. Note that there is no loss of generality,
as model developers could use their own priors formed from internal
views on scenarios or expert opinion in lieu of prior Federal Reserve
scenarios, and sensitivities may be reduced as well.
Panel B of Table 3 presents the results for bivariate regressions and,
similar to univariate results, Federal Reserve scenarios have greater
sensitivity than historical estimates. In the case of the pair of Real
GDP changes and Unemployment, while the posterior estimate for
Real GDP changes (-0.2147) is higher in absolute value, it is counter-
intuitively lower for Unemployment (0.0062). One possible reason for
this is that the Federal Reserve scenario dataset shows a correlation
between Unemployment and Real GDP changes relative to the histor-
ical pattern that is such that the posterior estimate is pulled in an unin-
tuitive direction. When we consider the Unemployment and HPI pair,
we observe the posterior estimate for Unemployment lower in abso-
lute value (0.3036 vs. 0.3738), which we also find to be counter-intui-
tive, and explain similarly as in the case of the Unemployment vs.
Real GDP Changes pair. The posterior estimate for the HPI sensitiv-
ity is estimated to be larger in absolute value (1-0.00731 vs. 10.00011). In
the case of Real GDP changes and HPI, the historical coefficient data
estimate for Real GDP Changes (HPI) is -0.2248 (-0.0038), and based
on the prior scenarios having greater sensitivity of -0.3953 (-0.0271).
For both macro variables, the posterior estimates are found to be
higher in absolute value (--0.2435- vs. -- 0.0091-).
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As with the univariate and bivariate regressions, we find for the
trivariate model that in general the absolute value of macro-sensitivi-
ties are greater in magnitude in the Federal Reserve scenario regres-
sions than in historical ones. The results for trivariate model
estimation are presented in Panel C of Table 3. For Real GDP
changes, the historical data (Federal Reserve scenarios) estimate of
the beta coefficient is -0.1014 (-0.3953) and the posterior estimate is -
0.1463, which is higher in absolute value. In the case of Unemploy-
ment, the historical data (Federal Reserve scenarios) estimate of the
beta coefficient is 0.3345 (0.4263, which is indicative of greater sensi-
tivity). The posterior parameter estimate for Unemployment is
counter-intuitively lower (0.2594). Considering the housing index
(HPI), coefficients are -0.0001 and -0.0065 for historical data and pos-
terior estimates, respectively.
In Figure 3, we present the Bayesian and Frequentist models, the
historical loss rates, and the forecasted scenario loss rates (Bayesian
vs. Frequentist modeled in the case of the severely adverse scenarios
and the Frequentist modeled for the base case). We observe that
while the models tend to under- (over-) predict in the stress (recent
benign) period, optically the Bayesian model actually performs worse
in the stress period and better in the recent period. However, in the
severe adverse scenario, the Bayesian modeled losses reach more ex-
treme levels than those Frequentist modeled ones - this is a good
property from a supervisory perspective, as it reflects greater con-
servativism. Additionally, we observe a steeper reversion to normal
levels of loss in the Bayesian model than in the Frequentist one.
Figure 4 displays the estimated posterior distributions of the se-
verely adverse loss rates for each quarter and of the cumulative 9-
quarter losses. Figure 4 - Panel A shows that losses peak on average
at around the third to sixth quarters, with the densities shifting left-
ward, and that the dispersion of the distributions also increases. This
poses a dilemma revealed by the Bayesian approach that there is more
parameter uncertainty just in the periods of its greatest importance for
stress testing, the periods of peak stress in the economic scenarios.
Figure 4 - Panel B shows that cumulative losses are centered in the
low 40 percentages, with a fairly large relative variation (30%) with
respect to the mean. Moreover, there is significant right-skewness,
suggesting that the mean posterior loss rate may not be the most rep-
resentative of the posterior distribution.
In Table 4, we summarize the posterior conditional severely adverse
loss distributions of the Bayesian regression model, for both quarterly
and cumulative 9-quarter ABCOs, presenting both summary statistics
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and numerical Bayesian coefficients of variation (BNCV), which mea-
sures the relative variation in the posterior samples. The BNCV is
defined as the ratio of the Bayesian 95th percentile credible interval
(B95CI) - which is the Bayesian analogue of the classical 95th percen-
tile confidence interval - to the mean of the posterior distribution:
Bcv95 - Q975 (x) - Q2.5 (x) _ B95CIx
BNCI X N (13)
Exi
i=1
where X is a random variable, x = (xj,..,XN) is a vector of draws from
the posterior distribution of X, Q97.5 and Q2.5 are the respective
empirical 97.5th and 2.5th quantiles of x, and Y= L x is the pos-
terior sample mean of x. i=1
Figure 5 presents the posterior conditional severely adverse quar-
terly-loss distributions of the Bayesian regression model. Variability
in the loss distribution displays a humped shape across the nine
quarters, with the highest losses observed around the 5th and 6th
quarters. In addition, the humped shape of the distributions become
skewed for worst losses (97.5th percentile and maximum), while it is
more symmetric for optimistic loss outcomes (minimum and 2.5th per-
centile). Results for the BNCV measure, shown in Table 4, display a
humped shaped pattern in variability over the forecast horizon. The
BNCV measure can be interpreted as the proportional model risk un-
certainty buffer, stemming from the parameter uncertainty as inferred
from the Bayesian regression model. This result is an important con-
tribution of our research focusing on the model validation aspect of
stress testing, as we have a quantity that can be used in model moni-
toring or backtesting, which is not purely based upon data but also
incorporates prior views on model parameters.
In Table 5, we summarize the conditional severely adverse loss dis-
tributions of the Frequentist regression model, for both quarterly and
cumulative 9-quarter aggregate bank gross charge-off rates. Classical
Frequentist coefficients of variation (FCV) is the simple ratio of the
Frequentist 95th percent confidence interval (F95CI) to the mean of
the sampling distribution:
FCV9 5 (Y+1.96 xsx)-(F-1.96 xsx) - F95CIx (14)
where sx is the standard error of the forecast mean. Losses average a
range of 0.9% to 1.7% in the first two quarters, peaking at a mean
ranging in 2.3%-3.6% and reverting to a mean of 1.2% to 1.7% in the
final two quarters. We observe that the variability in the loss distribu-
tion displays a U-shape, peaking in the low loss early and end
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quarters: the standard error drops from a range of 0.34% -0.38%, to a
range of 0.28%-0.34%, and then rises to a range of 0.41%-0.46%.
This observation on the pattern in variability over the forecast horizon
holds on a relative basis as well, by considering the FCV. The relative
variability in the loss distribution displays a U-shape, peaking in the
early and later quarters: the FCV decreases from a range of 77%-
161%, to a range of 32%-56%, and then rising to a range of 94%-
153% in the first two, middle and last two quarters, respectively. The
FCV measure can be interpreted as the proportional model risk un-
certainty buffer, stemming from the sampling error as inferred from
the Frequentist regression model.
We contribute to the model validation literature by comparing the
proportional model risk buffer measures obtained from our empirical
implementation of the Bayesian to the Frequentist models. One com-
mon way to estimate a model risk buffer is as a measure of statistical
uncertainty generated by a model, such as a standard error or a confi-
dence interval; other means of quantifying this metric include sensitiv-
ity analysis around model inputs or model assumptions, i.e., varying
the latter and measuring the variability of the model output. The
model risk buffer is a valuable model validation tool, as it helps us to
understand the potential expected variability in model output - e.g.,
when we perform model benchmarking or backtesting, we can gauge
if new observation of actual results are lying in an expected range, and
this can serve as a basis for remedial actions such as model overlays,
or potentially re-developing a flawed model whose outcomes are not
within the expected range.
The mean of the posterior distribution in the 9-quarter severely ad-
verse loss generated by the Bayesian model is 43.2%, with a Bayesian
95th percent credible interval of 11.0%, resulting in a BNCV of
25.5%. The mean of the sampling distribution in the 9-quarter se-
verely adverse loss generated by the Frequentist model is 20.6%, with
a classical 95th percent confidence interval of 4.1%, resulting in a
FCV of 20.0%. Therefore, our Bayesian analysis suggests that a quan-
titatively developed model risk uncertainty buffer to account for pa-
rameter uncertainty is 5% (20%) higher in absolute (relative) terms
than that implied by the Frequentist model.
We compare the Bayesian and Frequentist stress testing models ac-
cording to several measures of model performance, as commonly used
in model validation exercises. First, we use the root mean squared
error (RMSE), which measures the average squared deviation of
model predictions from actual observations:
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RMSE= -X(P-Aj) 2 (15)
where Pi are predicted and A; actual. Secondly, we calculate
squared-correlation (SC) between model predictions and actual
observations:
- -2
SC =N=N jI= 72 (16)
-lN2 2Ai - AY12
Finally, we consider a measure widely used in model validations of
stress testing models for CCAR or Dodd-Frank Act Stress Tests, the
cumulative percentage error (CPE), which is favored by prudential
regulators:
N
CPE = = (17)N
We estimate these model performance measures, in-sample, and
across the entire historical period (2001-2013) and over the twelve
quarter downturn period (2006-2009).57 In addition, we estimate the
sampling distributions of these measures using a bootstrap procedure,
in order to test the statistical significance of the observed differences
in model performance measures. We observe, in Table 6, that the Fre-
quentist model outperforms the Bayesian model according to RMSE
and SC measures (10.1% and 84.5% vs. 15.4% and 75.2%, in mean,
for the entire sample; 13.9% and 92.0% vs. 19.6% and 87.0%, in
mean, for the downturn sample). However, the Bayesian model out-
performs, over the entire sample as well as during the stressed period,
according to the 'CPE measure (7.9% and 5.9%, in mean, for the en-
tire sample; -13.7% and -12.1%, in mean, for the downturn sample).
It is not surprising that the Frequentist model performs better when
RMSE and SC measures are used for validation, since it is a model
which is purely calibrated to the historical data.
The reason for the Bayesian approach's superior performance, us-
ing the CPE-preferred measure of model validators and supervisors, is
57. A best practice would be to have out-of-sample or out-of-time model performance met-
rics, but paucity of data precludes that in this case, as it does in most CCAR and DFAST stress
testing modeling validations. However, these in-sample measures represent the current state of
the practice and are in line with supervisory expectations.
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that this model constrains the regression coefficients to exhibit more
sensitivity, so that when there are large losses, the model matches ac-
tuals to a great degree than when losses are toward the middle of the
distribution - intuitively, we are able to better match the tails of the
error distribution than its body. In contrast, the Frequentist regres-
sion model simply tries to minimize the total squared deviation over
the entire sample, which is modeling the body but not the tail of the
error distribution. Note, moreover, that we could also impose alterna-
tive priors - e.g., informed by external data, internal scenarios, or ex-
pert opinion - which could either accentuate this effect, or even work
in the opposite direction and dampen sensitivities.
IV. CONCLUSION
Since the 2008 financial crisis, stress testing has become the primary
means by government regulators in the United States to ensure that
banks have enough capital to survive another financial crisis. How-
ever, there are no guiding models for stress testing despite the impor-
tance of stress testing to the financial regulatory landscape.
This Article fills this void by proposing that banks utilize the Baye-
sian model in their stress tests, which takes into account past out-
comes - previous Federal Reserve scenarios serve as priors. This is
because of the belief in the industry that the Federal Reserve adapts
its scenarios to stress certain portfolios.
The Bayesian model requires a bigger buffer for uncertainty - by
25% - as opposed to simply modeling each year's scenario in isola-
tion. This means that if modelers do not take previous results into
account, they can underestimate losses significantly - by as much as
25%. This could be the difference between a successful stress test and
a failed stress test.
Stress testing is an emerging field, and banks are constantly trying
to forecast potential losses in a future recession to be able to manage
their capital effectively. Therefore, more innovations in modeling
credit risk will lead to better models - models that can incorporate
expert judgment, as well as the relationship between certain types of
losses. In turn, this will keep the American financial system secure
from another crisis.
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TABLE 1
Federal Reserve Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review
Program (CCAR)
Macroeconomic Variables Used in Supervisory Stress Testing
Scenarios
CCAR Macroeconomic Variable (MV) Code
Date
Real GDP (year-to-year) RGDPYY
Consumer Price Index CPI
Real Disposable Personal Income RDPI
Unemployment Rate UNEMP
2011 Three-month Treasury Bill Rate 3MTBR
Ten-year Treasury Bond Rate 10YTBR
BBB Corporate Rate BBBCR
Dow Jones Index DOi
National House Price Index HPI
All 2011 CCAR MVs +
Nominal GDP Growth RGDPG
2012 Nominal Disposable Income Growth 
NDPIG
Mortgage Rate MR
CBOE's Market Volatility Index VIX
Commercial Real Estate Price Index CREPI
2013 All 2011 & 2012 CCAR MVs
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TABLE 2
Summary Statistics and Correlations
Macroeconomic Variables and Bank Charge-offs
Historical Data vs. Federal Reserve Scenarios
(2001 - 2013)
Macroeconomic Variables
Statistic ABCO || RGDPYY | UNEMP | HPI
Count 56 56 56 56
Mean 0.70 1.94 6.39 150.21
Standard Deviation 0.79 1.90 1.88 26.63
Minimum 0.01 -4.09 3.92 101.60
Historical 25th Percentile 0.11 1.43 4.81 136.23
Data Median 0.22 2.10 5.77 144.45
75th Percentile 1.29 3.12 8.05 166.60
Maximum 2.73 5.27 9.91 199.00
Skewness 1.10 -1.48 0.56 0.29
Kurtosis -0.11 2.84 -1.09 -0.64
Count 21 30 30
Mean -0.73 11.90 129.02
Standard Deviation 2.02 1.73 9.84
Minimum -4.31 9.58 112.80
Fed 25th Percentile -1.96 10.54 120.80
Scenarios Median -0.58 11.49 128.85
75th Percentile 0.72 13.65 136.90
Maximum 2.14 14.31 142.40
Skewness -0.37 0.05 -0.25
Kurtosis -0.99 -1.62 -1.19
ABCO 100% - I -
Correlations RGDPYY -54.35% 100% - -
UNEMP 88.55% -37.91% 100% -
HPI -14.91% 3.90% -17.18% 100%
ABCO: Aggregate Bank Gross Charge-offs
RGDPYY: Year-on-Year Change in Real Gross Domestic Product
UNEMP: Unemployment Rate
HPI: National Housing Price Index
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TABLE 3
Estimation of Stress Testing Macroeconomic Models
Bayesian with Federal Reserve Scenario Priors vs. Historical
Models GDP, Unemployment Rate, and Housing Index
RGDPYY UNEMP HPI

















Panel B: Bivariate Regressions - Posterior Distribution (f8)
Historical Model - RGDPYY & UNEMP -0.1013 0.3347
(-4.023) (13.14)
Bayesian Model - RGDPYY & UNEMP -0.2147 0.0062
(-4.226) (2.138)
Historical Model - UNEMP & HPI 0.3738 0.0001
(13.67) (0.049)
Bayesian Model - UNEMP & HPI 0.3036 -0.0073
(820.5) (-304.2)
Historical Model - RGDPYY & HPI -0.2248 -0.0038
(-4.725) (-1.123)
Bayesian Model - RGDPYY & HPI -0.2435 -0.0091
(-46.83) (-267.6)
Panel C: Trivariate Regressions- Posterior Distribution (f8)
Historical Model - RGDPYY, UNEMP & HPI -0.1014 0.3345 -0.0001
(-3.985) (12.82) (-0.058)
Bayesian Model - RGDPYY, UNEMP & HPI -0.1463 0.2594 -0.0065
(-38.50) (720.6) (-295.5)
T-statistics are presented in parenthesis with significant ones identi-
fied in bold.
RGDPYY: Year-on-Year Change in Real Gross Domestic Product
UNEMP: Unemployment Rate
HPI: National Housing Price Index
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TABLE 4
Posterior Conditional Distributions of
Bayesian Regression Model Quarterly and Cumulative 9-Quarter
Aggregate Bank Gross Charge-off Rates
Summary Statistics and Numerical Coefficients of Variation
Severe Losses
Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Cumulat1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 e
Minimum 0.41 0.99 132 1.61 1.74 1.75 1.53 0.84 0.00 21.01
2.5th Percentile 0.65 1.39 229 2.95 2.94 2.47 2.08 1.16 0.19 37.80
25th Percentile 0.75 1.61 2.84 3.74 3.63 2.87 2.30 1.38 0.59 41.32
Mean 0.80 1.73 3.13 4.15 3.99 3.08 2.42 1.50 0.80 43.23
75th Percentile 0.86 1.85 3.41 4.56 4.35 3.29 2.54 1.62 1.00 45.12
97.5th Percentile 0.96 2.07 3.99 5.37 5.06 3.71 2.77 1.86 1.41 48.81
Maximum 1.12 2.46 4.77 6.42 6.04 4.39 3.31 2.24 2.01 55.24
Skewness -0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.03 0,03 0.01 002 0.02 0.01
Kurtosis 0.12 0.14 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.19 0.04 0.03 0.41
Standard Error 0.08 0.17 0.43 0.61 0.54 0.32 0.18 0.18 0.31 2.82
95th Percentile




Cefsicientaf 37.61 38.97 54.10 58.42 53.26 40.57 28.85 46.31 153.48 25.49
Variation
TABLE 5
Distributions of Frequentist Regression Modeling
Quarterly and 9-Quarter Cumulative Aggregate Bank Gross
Charge-off Rates
Summary Statistics and Parametric Coefficients of Variation
Severe Losses
Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Cumulative1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Expected Value 0.92 1.71 2.78 3.56 3.49 2.94 2.38 1.71 1.20 20.58
Standard Error of
Staedadr 0.38 0.34 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.30 0.34 0.41 0.47 1.05
95th Percentile




Coeiiientof 160.67 77.78 41.16 31.64 31.95 42.02 56.48 93.74 153.44 19.99
Variation
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FIGURE 1
Time Series and Kernel Density Plots
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FIGURE 2
Density Plots and Posterior Distributions of Trivariate Bayesian
Regressions for Aggregate Bank Gross Charge-offs
(2001-2013)
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FIGURE 3
Historical, Scenario and Bayesian vs. Frequentist
Regression Modeling
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FIGURE 4
Posterior Conditional Distributions of Bayesian Regression
Modeling Quarterly Aggregate Bank Gross Charge-off Rates
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PANEL B
POSTERIOR CONDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF BAYESIAN REGRESSION
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FIGURE 5
Posterior Conditional Distributions of Bayesian Regression Model
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